Interest is booming in the so-called Internet of Things (IoT). The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is one application of this trend and involves the use of smart technologies in a manufacturing context. Even though these applications hold the promise to revolutionize manufacturing, there are a number of outstanding cybersecurity and data privacy issues impacting the realization of the myriad benefits promised by IIoT proponents. This article analyzes some of these pressing issues, focusing on: (1) critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity due diligence, (2) trends in transatlantic data privacy protections, and (3) the regulation of new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and blockchain. The aticle concludes with a list of recommendations for state and federal policymakers to consider in an effort to harden the IIoT along with the supply chains critical to the continued development of smart factories.
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, for only the second time in history at that point, a cyberattack was confirmed to have caused physical damage. 2 The first such episode was Stuxnet. 3 This time, the target was not Iran's nuclear program, but a steel mill in Germany. Specifically, a blast furnace was compromised causing "'massive'-though unspecified-damage." 4 Attackers had gained access to the plant through the firm's business network, highlighting the insecurity that can stem from interconnected systems even when a firewall is in place. 5 There have been unconfirmed reports of similar incidents, such as one involving a petrochemical factory that was compromised by a coffee maker. 6 This issue is coming to the fore with the expansion of Internet-connected devices in the manufacturing sector. These 7 The Internet of Things (IoT) underscores the notion of a hyper-connected future. 8 As one example, McKinsey Consulting has estimated the economic impact of the Internet of Things, or what may be more accurately described as the "Network of Things," 9 at $6.2 trillion by 2025. 10 The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), sometimes also called the "Factory of Things," or "Smart Factory Wave," involves the use of IoT technologies in manufacturing applications. 11 It holds the promise to revolutionize manufacturing, including in the fields of "factory health, digital thread, and smart products." 12 11. See Richard D. Taylor, The Next Stage of U.S. Communications Policy: The Emerging Embedded Infosphere, 41 TELECOMM. POL'Y 1039, 1039 (2017) ("The United States needs to reimagine the basic principles of its telecommunications and information policy to fit an emerging society in which networking and intelligence are embedded into an increasing number of everyday things which constantly monitor and measure our lives. This emerging environment is an always-on, ubiquitous, integrated system comprised of the Internet of Things, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence/Intelligent Systems and the Intercloud, which act together as a single system, referred to here as the 'Embedded Infosphere' (EI).").
12. See Mui, supra note 10. control systems. 13 However, while such products promote efficiency, they also increase the attack surface and with it the cyber risk that manufacturers must manage. 14 Numerous outstanding cybersecurity and data privacy issues impact the realization of the myriad benefits promised by IIoT, including the use of personal data in factory settings. 15 Yet, to date, there has been a paucity of literature on the topic. 16 IoT is a broad concept used colloquially to encompass many or all of the interconnected devices in our future. But industry experts identify three subsets to the general IoT category which are the Industrial Internet (i.e. all interconnected products, sensors, controls, etc., used in industry and business), the Internet-of-everything (consumer objects and systems that combine people and data), and the Cyber physical systems (which are the systems that connect it all)."); Kevin DiGrazia, Cyber Insurance, Data Security, and Blockchain in the Wake of the Equifax Breach, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255, 262 (2018) ("Firms purchasing cyber insurance should understand what their current insurance policies will cover, and what duplicate coverage and peril gaps exist. With the surge in automation of the IoT and the Industrial Internet of Things ("[IIoT]"), hackers will increasingly be able to cause physical damage to machinery and other equipment."); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 906 n.367 (2016) (noting that cyber attacks on the Industrial Internet of Things are increasing); Andrew G. Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 813 (2016) ("Experts predict that the worldwide scale of such 'smart,' interconnected objects will continue to grow, reaching more than fifty billion objects in 2020, and one trillion by 2025. As inexpensive, unobtrusive identifying technology combines with more sophisticated wireless networks, new possibilities will emerge to allow tracking of human and nonhuman activity. The result will be additional options for government surveillance that can reveal the patterns of everyday article analyzes some of these gaps, focusing on: (1) critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity due diligence, (2) trends in transatlantic data privacy protections relevant to manufacturers, and (3) the regulation of new technologies like AI and blockchain and their applicability to address IIoT security and privacy challenges. This article concludes with an analysis of options available to state and federal policymakers to help harden IIoT devices and supply chains against cyber attacks.
I. CYBERSECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY IIOT HOT TOPICS
Although there are differing accounts as to the origin story of the term "Internet of Things," most accounts point to Kevin Ashton coining it in the form of a title for a 1999 presentation for Proctor & Gamble. 17 But the idea has been around for longer, including as pervasive computing, "Ubiquitous Computing," and "Real-World Web." 18 Although these terms are not all analogous, 19 it is true that from these humble beginnings has come a global effort to make our technology, businesses, and 19. See Winter, supra note 18 (discussing the difference between "ubiquitous computing" and "ambient intelligence."). even our bodies, smart. 20 Wherever it came from, the term IoT today now enjoys widespread use in both technology and policy circles, as well as in popular culture. 21 It includes a constellation of devices and technologies with built-in wireless connectivity that "can be monitored, controlled [,] and linked" 22 together, as is represented in Figure 1 . along with vulnerabilities. 24 Already, though, some of the excitement may be fading in the wake of well-publicized vulnerabilities, such as may be seen with smart lightbulbs already being in the "Trough of Disillusionment" in Figure 1 . This section explores some of the security implications in the smart factory revolution, what has been called the "fourth revolution" in this space, 25 before moving on to analyzing the associated policy implications.
A. SMART FACTORIES AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is tasked with defining and defending these vital industries, which it subdivides into sixteen sectors. 26 sector in January 2017. 27 Smart factories fall under an array of critical infrastructure sectors, including the critical manufacturing sector itself (which comprises electrical equipment and appliances along with transportation) along with the communications, healthcare, and even the defense industrial base. As such, firms operating in this space should be aware of the possibility for substantial federal oversight, such as would have been required under the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. 28 Each of these sixteen sectors boasts an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) to help spread cyber threat information, along with awareness as to best practices. 29 Efforts have also been made to break down silos between sectors, such as through Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs). 30 Such public-private bi-directional information sharing between the critical infrastructure sectors will be essential to defending the IIoT, including both information technology (IT) (e.g., business systems) and operations technology (OT) that cover those systems in the manufacturing environment. 31 The latter distinction is important since IT efforts typically prioritize their focus on confidentiality, integrity and then availability, while OT efforts place the highest priority on availability. Compounding the challenge is that most existing OT systems do not have the capacity to add cybersecurity protections without negatively impacting production. This fact will be all the more important as threats to smart factories proliferate.
Threats from Foreign Nation-States and Economic Espionage Campaigns
In March 2018, the FBI and DHS jointly accused the Russian government of a "multi-stage intrusion campaign" targeting the U.S. power grid along with compromising the industrial control systems of several "small commercial facilities." 32 This episode is just one data point in a long history of cyber attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure with links to Russia. 33 The United States is far from alone. For example, Ukraine experienced waves of attacks including "the first-ever confirmed cyberattack against grid infrastructure." 34 Russia is not alone in its online aggression either, with the list of cyber powers growing to more than fifty nations, not to mention sophisticated criminal organizations, firms, and hacktivists. 35 Iran, for example, has reportedly readied a wave of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure in response to the United States' withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement. 36 Yet the threat of cyber conflict is also only one facet in the multi-faceted cyber risk facing smart factories. Another facet is the continued prevalence of trade secrets theft, even after the U.S.-China 2015 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct, which was designed to safeguard commercial intellectual property and was prompted in part by hackers targeting U.S. Steel. 37 The rise of IIoT generally, and smart factories in particular, has expanded the threat surface against which manufacturers will have to protect their systems and property, necessitating advances in cybersecurity due diligence. In one demonstration, for example, a single compromised wireless webcam was able to "jam all wireless communication and thereby stop production" at a factory. 38 Other threats are numerous and can emanate from an array of actors such as criminal organizations, terrorist groups, insider threats, and intellectual property thieves. 39 2. Meaning of "Cybersecurity Due Diligence" for Smart Factories "Due diligence" has a multitude of meanings depending on the context, nation, and sector involved. 40 context, cybersecurity due diligence has been defined as "the review of the governance, processes, and controls that are used to secure information assets." 41 This broad understanding builds from the corporate, national, and international obligations of both state and non-state actors to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices across a range of actors. 42 Such a broad, multidisciplinary understanding of this concept is vital in the IoT context in particular, given the extent to which networks and systems interact. Here, cybersecurity due diligence is centered on identifying and spreading risk management best practices between State and non-State actors, so as to promote security in smart manufacturing. One illustration is the Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) Framework, which considers the "capabilities that integrate the governance, management and assurance of performance, risk, and compliance activities" across an organization. 43 The question becomes how manufacturers can fulfill GRC responsibilities, which include not just protecting technical infrastructure, but also safeguarding trade secrets and sensitive personal data that may be subject to big data analytics and deep learning. 44. In general, data privacy policies are needed to cover proprietary manufacturing data generated by the IIoT. Such data may range from the code that runs machines to the output of sensors that measure recipe amounts and composition. There are a number of situations where such data may be captured and aggregated by supply chain partners, equipment manufacturers, and others. The lack of a clear delineation of ownership is an impediment for companies to connect their IIoT systems to each other, reducing the benefits of digital manufacturing.
Federal Cybersecurity Frameworks and Standards Impacting Smart Factories
Two of the main efforts aimed at defining cybersecurity due diligence that are most relevant to the smart factory context are the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) and the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) guidance. 45 The NIST CSF was born from President Obama's efforts to empower NIST to partner with industry and develop a framework comprised of private-sector cybersecurity best practices that would help inform an array of organizations in their cybersecurity decision-making processes, but particularly those operating critical infrastructure. 46 The result was the first NIST CSF, in 2014. While critics have complained about the framework's reactive stance, 47 it nevertheless is helping to define cybersecurity due diligence in the United States. 48 The NIST CSF takes manufacturing concerns into account; indeed, NIST deserves credit for focusing its efforts on improving cybersecurity due diligence in factories, as seen in its published Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile that is "a roadmap for reducing 45 cybersecurity risk for manufacturers." 49 Rather than replace security policies already in effect, NIST intends these "voluntary, risk-based" efforts to enhance existing commitments and support organizations in their efforts to "identify, implement, and improve cybersecurity practices, and create[] a common language for internal and external communication of cybersecurity issues." 50 The original NIST CSF was voluntary, 51 but advocates have increasingly made the case that if an organization's "cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the 'standard' for 'due diligence' was now the NIST [CSF]." 52 While it was originally published in 2014, NIST has remained engaged in this space, 53 as seen in the development of the 2018 NIST Privacy Framework, 54 and the 2016 NIST CSF for small businesses, 55 all of which are important data points for boosting cybersecurity and privacy due diligence in the smart manufacturing context.
The NIST CSF not only has the potential to gradually shape a standard of care for domestic manufacturing, but also could help to harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for given active NIST collaborations with more than twenty nations 49. KEITH A. STOUFFER ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF including the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and Germany. 56 Such a global push is particularly important in the manufacturing sector given the extent to which supply chains straddle jurisdictions, and even continents. 57 Progress toward further defining baseline cybersecurity due diligence in the manufacturing context has continued with the publication of Version 1.1 of the NIST CSF in April 2018, which, as Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross has argued "should be every company's first line of defense." 58 The new version boasts significant improvements, including modernized policies regarding authentication, supply chain cybersecurity, and vulnerability disclosure. 59 Yet, the NIST CSF is still best considered a cybersecurity floor rather than a ceiling. It does not, for example, focus on IoT issues in particular, which is an area that many would like NIST to address in more detail as is discussed further below.
Similar to NIST, commentators have made the case that the FTC suggests "tackling data security and all consumer-facing software development efforts with a holistic approach that incorporates a 'privacy by design' strategy to address the entire life cycle of data collection, use, access, storage and ultimately secure data deletion." 60 In particular, the FTC suggests keeping software updated, encrypting sensitive data, using multi-factor authentication, and having an updated incident response plan. The FTC is able to give such suggestions binding legal force thanks to Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which established the FTC and empowers it to police "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 62 The FTC has wielded this authority to penalize firms for lax privacy and cybersecurity standards. 63 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the FTC's power in this regard in 2015 in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide. 64 However, a 2018 case, LabMD Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, underscored a potential growing circuit split involving the FTC, which may require it to be more specific in the cybersecurity requirements it places on businesses. 65 This could include requiring more firms to take measures that so far the FTC has only encouraged on a voluntary basis, including: * [B]uild security into devices at the outset, rather than as an afterthought in the design process; * [T]rain employees about the importance of security, and ensure that security is managed at an appropriate level in the organization; * [E]nsure that when outside service providers are hired, that those providers are capable of maintaining reasonable security, and provide reasonable oversight of the providers; * [W]hen a security risk is identified, consider a "defense-in-depth" strategy whereby multiple layers of security may be used to defend against a particular risk;
-advice/business-center/small-businesses/cybersecurity/basics (last visited Nov. However, due to complex supply chains and a global customer base, U.S. federal IoT regulations are by no means the only ones IIoT proponents must consider. The next section considers the impact of the State of California's recent efforts before moving on to discuss the European Union's regulatory efforts at cybersecurity and data privacy in the smart manufacturing sector.
State-Level IIoT Policy: California Case Study
California's 2018 Consumer Privacy Act is helping set a new standard for U.S. Privacy protections, following in the footsteps of its groundbreaking 2002 privacy law that ushered in the first data breach notification standards. 67 This latter idea has since been copied by the other 49 states 68 and the European Union 69 as is discussed further in the next subsection. Although the 2018 Privacy Act 70 does not go quite as far as the European Union's new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 71 discussed below, it does include provisions that allow consumers to sue over data breaches, and obtain information about how their data is being gathered and used by companies to make more informed decisions. 72 Although there remains debate about the scope and
FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best
Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and Security Risks, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/ftc -report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-best-practices. 73 the law may well help shape the cybersecurity practices of the manufacturing base in California along with their business partners, such as by requiring added efforts to protect the privacy rights of consumers and suppliers. 74 This law builds on California's existing IoT policies. One of these relevant efforts dates back to 2016, when California expanded its definition of the term "personal information" to include "a person's name in combination with his or her Social Security number, driver's license or [state] identification card, credit or debit card number and password, or medical information." 75 This definition is still narrower than that applicable in the EU under the GDPR-where even a person's IP address is considered Personally Identifiable Information (PII)-but it should be considered a step in that direction. 76 In addition, California law requires "companies that share such information to not only take extra security precautions themselves when managing the information, but to ensure that any entities they share information with also abide by strict security measures." 77 Indeed, in practical effect, this regulation requires covered firms to include "contractual provisions mandating implementation of reasonable security measures." 78 This requirement could have an even greater impact on cybersecurity due diligence overall given the size of California's 74. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100(a) (Deering 2019) ("A consumer shall have the right to request that a business that collects a consumer's personal information disclose to that consumer the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business has collected." economy-which is bigger than the UK's as of 2018. 79 California's regulatory regime could further promote the global acceptance of both the NIST CSF and the FTC cybersecurity efforts discussed above.
B. TRANSATLANTIC APPROACHES TO DATA PRIVACY IN THE INDUSTRIAL IOT CONTEXT
As discussed above, the cybersecurity and data privacy regime within the United States is sector-specific. In contrast, the European Union has taken a distinct and far more regulatory and comprehensive approach. 80 Examples include the 2018 passage of the Network Information Security (NIS) Directive, and the enactment of the GDPR, both of which are explored in this section. The EU approach is not without its critics, such as those who are concerned about overcentralization, 81 but it is equally true that these efforts have made the EU a global leader in information governance best practices. 82 Information Security Public-Private Platform (NIS Platform) takes a risk management approach, and specifically adopts the NIST CSF core-identify, protect, detect, respond, recover-as the industry-standard EU approach for cybersecurity policy. 83 As such, this aspect of EU data governance underscores the extent to which the transatlantic approach to both cybersecurity and privacy is increasingly using both the language and tools of risk management introduced above.
As with cybersecurity and information privacy generally, the EU has long been engaged with IoT issues. 84 For example, the EU founded the Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation. 85 The European Commission has also engaged internationally, welcoming delegations from around the world to discuss IoT governance, 86 economic impact of IoT applications by 2025. 88 The latter is only one component in the "Digitising European Industry" initiative, which includes three pillars for IoT policy across the EU, including: "a thriving IoT ecosystem; a human-centered IoT approach; [and] a single market for IoT." 89 The proposed 2017 "European Data Economy" initiative would strengthen the move toward a single market for IoT across Europe. 90 In short, the EU is balancing between an embrace of the IoT and the economic opportunities it affords, 91 while also taking proactive steps to address its downsides, including by clarifying its own liability regimes. 92 These goals demonstrate how the EU is planning to secure the full gamut of IoT devices, including those in the manufacturing sector.
Impact of GDPR
A key aspect for how the EU will shape IoT governance is through the GDPR, which is an extension of its long push to create a Digital Single Market (DSM) introduced above. Although most of the press coverage of the GDPR has focused on its privacy protection regulations and the potentially very large penalties that can be imposed for not following the data privacy rules, 93 extent feasible, remaining regulatory walls between the EU Member States and move toward a single EU market. 94 Building from this foundation, GDPR is an expansive regulatory regime with a wide array of requirements on covered firms ranging from ensuring data portability and consent to mandating that firms disclose a data breach within seventy-two hours of a firm becoming aware of the incident and then conducting a post-mortem to ensure that a similar scenario will not recur. 95 As groundbreaking as these regulations are, though, they were not drafted with IoT in mind, despite a 2017 finding by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) that there is "no level zero defined for the security and privacy of connected and smart devices. . . .
[or] . . . legal guidelines for trust of IoT devices and services." 96 Further, European-level regulation is slow, and a blunt instrument-GDPR, as one example, took more than four years to be adopted after having been proposed in 2012. 97 Microsoft has argued that for manufacturing firms at least, "[t]he message is clear: manufacturers, even outside Europe, need to consider their exposure under the GDPR and plan accordingly." 98 More specifically, according to Olivier Van Hoof of the data management firm Collibria: 97. See, e.g., Scott Gordon, Will We Get a GDPR for the IOT?, SC MAGAZINE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.scmagazineuk.com/will-we-get-a-gdpr-for-the -iot/article/758037/ (arguing that the industry should establish standards for IoT security because regulation will not be enacted fast enough to address rapidly-developing privacy issues).
98. Çağlayan Arkan, Achieving GDPR Compliance in Manufacturing, MICROSOFT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/industry -blog/industry/manufacturing/achieving-gdpr-compliance-in-manufacturing/ [https://perma.cc/W2XR-JKCU].
"[GDPR] has particular relevance for the manufacturing industry, which is using AI and RFID [Radio Frequency Identification] to collect, use and integrate personal information into product manufacturing. Through IoT and their quest to make better connections with end users, manufacturers are collecting more information about consumers. And we've seen a number of studies indicating the manufacturing industry lags behind in cybersecurity. Therefore, specific safeguards should be established for these newer forms of electronic communications and sharing of personal data. And it shouldn't be taken lightly. Regulators will issue significant fines for GDPR non-compliance, up to 2-4% of global revenue for non-compliance. The deadline for compliance . . . [was] May 25, 2018." 99 As such, as with the California laws discussed above, the global impact of GDPR on the manufacturing sector should not be underestimated, and neither should the NIS Directive.
Applicability of NIS Directive to Smart Factories
Directives such as NIS have the benefit of providing more freedom to nations to craft solutions to common problems, such as the need for more robust critical infrastructure protection, but this can similarly be a cumbersome process. 100 However, these directives risk sacrificing consistency across the EU, along with the timeliness that is so critical in rapidly-evolving areas such as IoT innovation. 101 This author has argued that this "type of active industry dialogue is a crucial piece of the NIST Framework's success-as well as that of the more general bottom-up approach to cybersecurity regulation-in the United States, and is one that other nations are seeking to emulate." 102 However, EU directives are unlike regulations in that they are more nation-specific. Some variation is already apparent. For example, the French government is considering mandating liability for security lapses on the part of IoT manufacturers. 103 This is similar to the different approaches being taken by U.S. states when it comes to IoT security.
C. APPLICABILITY OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO MANAGING SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS
It is well-known that hackers can exploit vulnerabilities in software such as by sending users virus-infected emails or compromised links. 104 It is less well-known that attackers can also meddle with computers by altering the hardware on which the software runs. 105 These weaknesses are physical, and one might think they are therefore easier to identify than spotting a bug in millions of lines of code. In fact, they can be just as difficult to locate, if not more so. 106 As aforementioned, the supply chains for many firms are complex and frequently span dozens of jurisdictions and potentially hundreds of suppliers. Apple's iPhone, for example, relies on hundreds of suppliers from around the world. 107 Each of these steps in the manufacturing process introduces opportunities for security problems to arise. Recent research suggests that hackers could use smartphone apps to damage manufacturing equipment, or even destroy entire factories. 108 While no such large-scale disaster has yet taken place, even sophisticated retailers like Amazon have been fooled by counterfeit facsimiles of real products. 109 Some supply chain threats are more malicious. In 2012, Microsoft warned customers that malware was being loaded onto computers made in China "after they were shipped to a distributor." 110 Even innocent motives may underlie serious problems. In 2015, Lenovo installed advertising software on its computers, which had the effect of dangerously weakening system security. 111 It is also distinctly possible that government actors could compromise the supply chain for the purposes of espionage. 112 These issues are particularly problematic in the IIoT context as more technology is deployed in factories, expanding economic opportunities as well as the attack surface that manufacturers must defend.
One new way to help secure such complex supply chains involves blockchain technology. The blockchain is a decentralized database that can be stored and maintained across [Vol. 21:1 myriad systems. 113 Blockchain technology, for example, could be used to track and verify the inputs into complicated supply chains like Apple's. 114 Futurist Bernard Marr has argued that, "[u]ltimately, blockchain can increase the efficiency and transparency of supply chains and positively impact everything from warehousing to delivery to payment. Chain of command is essential for many things, and blockchain has the chain of command built in." 115 The Australian car manufacturer Tomcar, for example, pays its suppliers using Bitcoin. 116 Major multinational firms such as Unilever, Nestle, Tyson, Dole, and Walmart already use blockchain applications to keep track of food sources. 117 However, no blockchain is immune to hacking. 118 Policymakers around the world are taking a hard look at appropriate blockchain regulations, with divergent approaches being tried from Albany to Brussels. 119
II. ROLE FOR POLICYMAKERS
Policymakers at the state and federal level can help manufacturing firms better manage the multifaceted cyber threat facing smart factories. This part discusses some available reform options, beginning with civil society and insurance before moving on to standards bodies and finally to an analysis of pending bills before Congress and the importance of fostering international dialogue. 
A. INSTILLING CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT BEST PRACTICES: A ROLE FOR INSURANCE?
Instead of top-down regulation, many, particularly in industry, prefer self-regulation with the flexibility "to adapt to rapid technological progress." 120 Such self-regulation has the capacity to adapt better and faster than black letter law to rapidly changing technological and social forces, 121 though it is certainly not without its problems. 122 Consumer Reports is an example of an organization that is trying to create such a community. In March 2017, Consumer Reports launched its Digital Standard, which is designed "to measure the privacy and security of products, apps, and services." 123 Once it fully matures, the Digital Standard could help empower consumers to select products-including in the IoT context-that meet rigorous privacy and security requirements. Of course, Consumer Reports is not a regulatory organization, vendors will still be legally able to sell products that do not meet the Digital Standard. However, the Digital Standard might help the market function more efficiently by rewarding those firms that take cybersecurity and data privacy seriously and penalizing those that do not through lower scores and, as a result, less revenue. These efforts are already having an impact, the Digital Standard was instrumental in exposing privacy risks in the fertility app Glow. 124 globalized, as is happening now in dialogue with the EU, it will likely further impact the trajectory and rate of global IoT privacy and security standards, including those available to manufacturers. 125 The insurance industry is similarly helping to incentivize the uptake of cybersecurity best practices. Chris Palmer, a former Technology Director of the Electronic Frontiers Foundation has called it a "key part of the [cybersecurity] solution." 126 Although estimates vary, 127 this market could be worth more than $7.5 billion by 2020, 128 and $23.07 billion by 2025. 129 Regulatory developments, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) cyber attack disclosure guidelines, could reinforce this trend. 130 Yet calculating cyber risk insurance premiums is no simple feat given the paucity of reliable data. 131 Even defining covered "cyber attacks" and cybersecurity best practices can be difficult, though an insurance company might use the NIST CSF and FTC guidelines discussed above as helpful data points. 132 Overall, the insurance industry could aid in the process of boosting cybersecurity due diligence across the economy, including in the manufacturing sector. Over time, such efforts may improve the overall level of cybersecurity preparedness of manufacturing firms, though it is important to understand that such coverage is only part of the solution, and that it is vital to review coverage terms lest patchy policies contribute to an inaccurate and reactive mindset on the part of covered firms. 133
B. FEDERAL POLICY OPTIONS
An array of policy options are being discussed at the federal level that would impact the growth and development of IIoT applications. This section focuses on the most recent of these efforts, including establishing baseline cybersecurity standards through an IoT security bill, protecting consumer privacy through a repackaged Privacy Bill of Rights, as well as -insurance-market ("The global [c]yber security insurance market size was USD 3.89 billion in 2017 and is expected to grow to USD 23.07 billion in 2025 . . . ."). See also 33.8%+ Growth for Cyber Insurance Market Size to 2024, MARKETWATCH, (Feb. 8, 2019, 11:22 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/ press-release/338-growth-for-cyber-insurance-market-size-to-2024-2019-02-08 ( There are proposals at the federal level, similar to California's 2018 Consumer Privacy Act. These proposals seek to codify some of the protections similar to the protections in the GDPR, discussed above. This Privacy Bill of Rights, a version of which was first trumpeted by the Obama Administration in 2012, was part of the CONSENT (Consumer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-provider Network Transgressions) Act introduced by Senate Democrats in 2018 in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 141 If enacted, the law would require covered firms "to obtain opt-in consent from users before sharing, selling or otherwise using their personal information . . . [along with] develop[ing] reasonable data security practices." 142 It would impact manufacturers directly since its cybersecurity and data processing requirements would apply not just to social networks, but to an array of publicly traded firms including those deploying IIoT tech. 143 Concerns regarding the ACDC act, though, fall across several dimensions. Some, such as former National Security Agency Directors Admiral Michael S. Rogers and Keith Alexander, are concerned about further complicating an already complex cyber threat landscape. 152 Others, such as Rob Joyce, President Trump's cybersecurity adviser, are more concerned about sanctioning "vigilantism" which could, he argued, even in a best-case scenario, lead to "unqualified actors bringing risk to themselves, their targets, and their governments." 153 A new version of the Act was introduced in 2019. 154 In general, there is a growing consensus that firms should practice passive defense best practices, 155 and not "hacking back" to recover assets due to serious concerns regarding attribution and escalation. 156
C. GOVERNING SMART FACTORIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORMS DEVELOPMENT
There are many ways to conceptualize cybersecurity policy in the IIoT context, but among them is the dynamic field of polycentric governance. 157 As this author has described it previously, this governance framework may be considered to be a multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multisectoral model, 158 169, 171 (2011) (defining polycentricity as "a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes.").
158. See id. at 171-72 (explaining the characteristics of polycentric governance). going global. 166 The success of such frameworks, civil society efforts like the Consumer Reports Digital Standard, 167 and regional regimes like the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 168 is part and parcel of the literature on polycentric governance given the extent to which it leverages selforganization while also recognizing the need for a coordinating function between disparate groups and governance scales. 169 However, it is important to note that not all polycentric systems are guaranteed to be successful. Disadvantages, for example, can include gridlock and a lack of defined hierarchy. 170 The Ostrom Design Principles referenced above can help predict the institutional success of given interventions. 171 Still, the literature remains immature, as does the current state of IoT governance. In fact, the ISACA, previously known as the Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 172 surveyed IT professionals in the United Kingdom and found that "75 percent of the security experts polled say they do not believe device manufacturers are implementing sufficient security measures in IoT devices, and a further 73 percent say existing security standards in the industry do not sufficiently address IoT specific security concerns." 173 [Vol. 21:1 Manufacturing firms should engage in these conversations. Manufacturing firms have already made considerable progress in making attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, including smart factories, off limits. They have also made considerable investments in both security and privacy by design, but they can go farther by refining the scope. This involves further refining the scope of cybersecurity due diligence at the international level, as well as boosting public-private information sharing, and even recasting the cybersecurity debate in the manufacturing sector as not just an exercise in cost-benefit analysis, but as a corporate social responsibility. Firms could build from this conception by participating in communities to help spread this approach, such as through the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, 174 and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. 175 
CONCLUSION
As the IoT matures, and more things and organizations are connected, there is a potential to build smart (and potentially more resilient) things, factories, and societies. Smart factories and their impacts span myriad sectors and industries. In response, polycentric IoT governance systems should be leveraged to improve critical infrastructure security and protect consumer privacy. 176 This includes frameworks and standardsincluding an NIST IoT-specific effort-along with the Consumer Reports Digital Standard, and the use of corporate governance structures, such as sustainability, and international norms, including due diligence. Such an "all-of-the-above" polycentric approach is essential to addressing governance gaps in smart factories as part of improving security and data privacy in the ever-expanding Internet of Everything.
